NORWAY:
Technical information in connection with the accident between
Rustad and Rena
NSB : 05 January, 2000
The train 2369, departure time from Hamar 12.30 and arrival at Rena 13.21
consisted of engine set BM 9214, made up of an engine and steering car.
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photo: Aftenposten
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The train 2302, departure
time from Trondheim 07.45 and arrival at Hamar 13.50 consisted of Di 3 625
engine and two B3 + BF11 carriages.
The trains would normally pass
each other at Rustad station at 13.10. Both trains were manned by one driver
and an on-board conductor.
NSB estimate that there were
approx. 100 persons involved in the accident, but this figure has not been
confirmed at this time.
General
All material involved has been
maintained in accordance with applicable regulations.
NSB has no reports on delayed or postponed maintenance routines or safety-critical
faults on the material.
The trains were equipped with ATC, but the permanent plant along this stretch
of track on the Røros line is not equipped with this system.
All carriages including the engines are equipped with fire extinguishing
equipment.
Rolling stock specifications
BM-92-14, delivered in 1985.
Constructed in accordance with the then current fire regulations for rolling
stock for the German State Railway / Germany and other European countries.
DI-3, delivered in 1965. This
type of locomotive is a 1950s model and is still in use in large numbers
around the world. There were no special fire regulations for rolling stock
in force at that time.
The locomotive is constructed in accordance with the then current American
Standard.
B-3 carriages. The carriages,
which were delivered in the 1960s were constructed in accordance with
the then current standards standard.
Tank capacity
Maximum
tank capacity of the diesel tank of DI-3 is 3,500 litres.
For BM-92 the maximum capacity is 1,600 litres.
According to our preliminary calculations the total volume of diesel could
be in the region of 3,500 litres.
Use of mobile telephones
It
is a fact that all trains are equipped with mobile telephones and that these
telephones can be reached from the train management centres. Whether or
not there has been a lack of clarity concerning the use of mobile telephones
and the degree to which this may have had any bearing on the accident are
among the matters that will now be investigated by the Railway Authoritys
Accident Commission and NSBs Accident Commission.
Short description of SAFETY SYSTEM, ATC and CTC
SAFETY PLANT
There shall
never be more than one train on a single track or stretch of track at the
same time. The safety system shall prevent two trains both receiving a green
light for the same single track or for the same stretch between stations
at the same time. It is the safety system that furnishes the technical safety
aspects.
ATC means automatic train control
and is a technical system that monitors among other things that trains do
not accidentally pass through signals set at stop (red) by the safety system
on the track /stations. The system is composed of a combination of technical
devices in the infra-structure which operate independently of the safety
system installation on the track and the equipment onboard the train. The
rolling stock involved in the accident was equipped with this system but
the infra structure is not. The total system was therefore not equipped
with ATC.
CTC(Central Traffic Control)
is a technical system for the remote control of stations (points changers
and signals) from a central operations unit (in this case from the Hamar
train operations control centre) and ensures that correct signals are given
and tracks allocated for trains on the stretch controlled.
Communications
Train
radios are not installed on the Røros Line, and the train drivers
communicate with the operations control centre via a dedicated closed circuit
telephone system train management that is installed at all main signals.
Additionally, all trains are equipped with NMT mobile telephones. Mobile
telephones are the only method of communication for trains under way on
the Røros line. Calls are logged at the train operations control
centre, not onboard the trains.
Safety regimes
NSB
run trains in accordance with the Railway Authoritys regulations and
in accordance with instructions from the Railway Authoritys operations
control which administrates traffic. Separate regulations in NSB will always
be based on the Railway Authoritys regulations.
The Railway Authoritys Accident Commission
The
Railway Authority has an accident commission that investigates serious accidents
related to train operations occurring on the national railway network. NSB
has placed experts at the disposal of the commission. The commission is
led by Traffic Safety Director Ove Skovdahl.
NSBs Accident Commission
NSB
has established its own accident commission. The commission shall investigate
all serious accidents and near accidents related to traffic safety and train
operation. The commission operates under the auspices of the NSBs
Traffic Safety Manager Helge Holtebekk. Investigative work is led by the
Safety Manager of NSB Operations and Technical Dept. Svein Ivar Johannessen.
The results of the commissions work will be made public when the commissions
task is finished.
Operating conditions
NSBs
train drivers are subject to comprehensive training and work in strict accordance
with regulations relating to safety, operational working hours and rest
periods. Personnel are monitored by line management in co-operation with
the Safety Office of the Operations and Technical Dept. In addition to the
regulations issued by the Railway Authority, separate procedures have been
developed by NSB that govern the train drivers and on-board staffs
work. Contingency plans have been prepared. Operative management of personnel
and the initiation of contingency plans are managed by the Operations Management
Centre (established in Oslo and Trondheim).
Train operations on Wednesday 05.01.
The
Operations Management Centre in Oslo issued the following bulletin concerning
traffic operations on the Røros line.
The Dovre line and other stretches
are under normal operation.
Traffic past the site of the
accident is being effectuated by bus and taxi. This solution is envisaged
to be in operation for the whole 24 hour period of Wednesday 05.01.
Passengers are as a general rule
transported by bus/taxi on the stretch Hamar Rena Koppang
in both directions. Trains are in operation in both directions between Koppang
and Røros.
Source: NSB (Norwegian
State Railways)
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