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Chronology of Rail Accidents in Norway

Norwegian State Railways

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Technical information in connection with the accident between Rustad and Rena

NSB : 05 January, 2000
 The train 2369, departure time from Hamar 12.30 and arrival at Rena 13.21 consisted of engine set BM 9214, made up of an engine and steering car.

Norwegian train collision
photo: Aftenposten

The train 2302, departure time from Trondheim 07.45 and arrival at Hamar 13.50 consisted of Di 3 625 engine and two B3 + BF11 carriages.

The trains would normally pass each other at Rustad station at 13.10. Both trains were manned by one driver and an on-board conductor.

NSB estimate that there were approx. 100 persons involved in the accident, but this figure has not been confirmed at this time.


All material involved has been maintained in accordance with applicable regulations.
NSB has no reports on delayed or postponed maintenance routines or safety-critical faults on the material.
The trains were equipped with ATC, but the permanent plant along this stretch of track on the Røros line is not equipped with this system.
All carriages including the engines are equipped with fire extinguishing equipment.
Rolling stock specifications

BM-92-14, delivered in 1985. Constructed in accordance with the then current fire regulations for rolling stock for the German State Railway / Germany and other European countries.

DI-3, delivered in 1965. This type of locomotive is a 1950’s model and is still in use in large numbers around the world. There were no special fire regulations for rolling stock in force at that time.
The locomotive is constructed in accordance with the then current American Standard.

B-3 carriages. The carriages, which were delivered in the 1960’s were constructed in accordance with the then current standards standard.

Tank capacity
Maximum tank capacity of the diesel tank of DI-3 is 3,500 litres.
For BM-92 the maximum capacity is 1,600 litres.
According to our preliminary calculations the total volume of diesel could be in the region of 3,500 litres.

Use of mobile telephones

It is a fact that all trains are equipped with mobile telephones and that these telephones can be reached from the train management centres. Whether or not there has been a lack of clarity concerning the use of mobile telephones and the degree to which this may have had any bearing on the accident are among the matters that will now be investigated by the Railway Authority’s Accident Commission and NSB’s Accident Commission.

Short description of SAFETY SYSTEM, ATC and CTC

There shall never be more than one train on a single track or stretch of track at the same time. The safety system shall prevent two trains both receiving a green light for the same single track or for the same stretch between stations at the same time. It is the safety system that furnishes the technical safety aspects.

ATC means automatic train control and is a technical system that monitors among other things that trains do not accidentally pass through signals set at stop (red) by the safety system on the track /stations. The system is composed of a combination of technical devices in the infra-structure which operate independently of the safety system installation on the track and the equipment onboard the train. The rolling stock involved in the accident was equipped with this system but the infra structure is not. The total system was therefore not equipped with ATC.

CTC(Central Traffic Control) is a technical system for the remote control of stations (points changers and signals) from a central operations unit (in this case from the Hamar train operations control centre) and ensures that correct signals are given and tracks allocated for trains on the stretch controlled.


Train radios are not installed on the Røros Line, and the train drivers communicate with the operations control centre via a dedicated closed circuit telephone system train management that is installed at all main signals. Additionally, all trains are equipped with NMT mobile telephones. Mobile telephones are the only method of communication for trains under way on the Røros line. Calls are logged at the train operations control centre, not onboard the trains.

Safety regimes

NSB run trains in accordance with the Railway Authority’s regulations and in accordance with instructions from the Railway Authority’s operations control which administrates traffic. Separate regulations in NSB will always be based on the Railway Authority’s regulations.

The Railway Authority’s Accident Commission

The Railway Authority has an accident commission that investigates serious accidents related to train operations occurring on the national railway network. NSB has placed experts at the disposal of the commission. The commission is led by Traffic Safety Director Ove Skovdahl.

NSB’s Accident Commission

NSB has established its own accident commission. The commission shall investigate all serious accidents and near accidents related to traffic safety and train operation. The commission operates under the auspices of the NSB’s Traffic Safety Manager Helge Holtebekk. Investigative work is led by the Safety Manager of NSB Operations and Technical Dept. Svein Ivar Johannessen. The results of the commission’s work will be made public when the commission’s task is finished.

Operating conditions

NSB’s train drivers are subject to comprehensive training and work in strict accordance with regulations relating to safety, operational working hours and rest periods. Personnel are monitored by line management in co-operation with the Safety Office of the Operations and Technical Dept. In addition to the regulations issued by the Railway Authority, separate procedures have been developed by NSB that govern the train driver’s and on-board staff’s work. Contingency plans have been prepared. Operative management of personnel and the initiation of contingency plans are managed by the Operations Management Centre (established in Oslo and Trondheim).

Train operations on Wednesday 05.01.
The Operations Management Centre in Oslo issued the following bulletin concerning traffic operations on the Røros line.

The Dovre line and other stretches are under normal operation.

Traffic past the site of the accident is being effectuated by bus and taxi. This solution is envisaged to be in operation for the whole 24 hour period of Wednesday 05.01.

Passengers are as a general rule transported by bus/taxi on the stretch Hamar – Rena – Koppang in both directions. Trains are in operation in both directions between Koppang and Røros.

Source: NSB (Norwegian State Railways)

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This file last updated: Monday, 10-Jan-2000 21:15:36 EST
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